Introduction
A group of investigators from the University of Missouri-Rolla's (UMR) Natural Hazards Mitigation Institute (NHMI) and the U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) Mid-Continent Geographic Science Center (MCGSC) formed a team to collect perishable data in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The field activities took place in the second week of October 2005. The team focused on three topics: transportation structures, flood-protection systems, and the environmental condition of the sediment debris. This article presents the geotechnical considerations of the flood-protection systems, and the two other topics are addressed in separate papers in this circular (Chen and others, this volume). Even though most of the media attention has been on the New Orleans levee/floodwall failures that flooded densely populated areas, our team also observed severe damage to miles of the flood-protection system along the Mississippi River south to the town of Venice, La., on Louisiana Highway 23 (LA-23).
Geologic Setting
The Mississippi River Delta has been laid down by an intricate system of distributary channels. During the last 11,000 years, sea level has risen 350 ft (106.7 m), and the grade of the river has flattened. Channel sands are laterally restricted to major distributary channels, or "passes." The modern Mississippi River Delta has been deposited during the past 6,000 years in four major areas. New Orleans lies within the Mississippi River Deltaic Plain and is located between Lake Pontchartrain on the north and the
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Mississippi River to the south. Its geology is highly variable both in the lateral and vertical extents. Much of the city is underlain by thick deposits of dark organic clays mixed with wood, roots, and other organic materials that resulted from extensive marshes and swamps formerly characterizing the area. This material is of a very low density and generally has high water content. It is actively decaying where development has lowered the water table, leading to areas of significant subsidence throughout the city. The St. Bernard and Plaquemines components of the Mississippi River Delta are its youngest features. They deposit nutrient-rich silt, which promotes the growth of freshwater swamps. Most of the St. Bernard Delta has subsided below sea level (Saucier, 1994) .
Damage to the Flood-protection System
The flood-protection system for New Orleans and the towns that lie along the Mississippi River down through the delta comprises two separate types of flood-control barriers. The first of these is the earthen levee, and the second is the floodwall with a sheet-pile base. In some instances these two basic forms of flood protection are combined, such as a shorter floodwall over a smaller levee. Complete earthen levee failures were not observed in the New Orleans area, although a number of the earthen levees in locations along the delta of the Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish exhibited severe damage. In some instances levees suffered complete failure ( fig. 1A) , and in other cases levee banks experienced severe erosion without complete failure ( fig. 1B) .
Examination of aerial photographs from files available at the Plaquemines Parish Web site (e.g., http://photos. plaqueminesparish.com/displayimage.php?album=16&pos=6) shows such failures very clearly. The breach at Nairn, La., however, was of a levee tied to a steel piling failure, and these types of flood-protection components were found much more commonly both in New Orleans and along the road on south LA-23 ( fig. 2) . Figure 2A is a view of the levee system that was breached, as seen in the bottom left of the photograph. Figure 2B is a partially failed levee with a reduced cross section.
At locations where the floodwall was based on a piling, there were two forms of structure: (1) the piling alone and (2) a concrete overwall sometimes increasing the wall height. Piling failure after overtopping was observed in a number of places, both in New Orleans and in Plaquemines Parish. In large measure, the pattern for failure appeared to be the same in most of these cases (where evidence still remained).
The most likely first step of the failure mechanism was water overtopping the wall, followed immediately by scouring of soil on the landward side adjacent to the wall. In many cases this was the only stage of damage that occurred, and the floodwall itself remained erect. Where the wall adjoined an earthen levee, however, there was additional scouring that could occur at the interface, as shown in figure 3.
As the water continued to pour over the wall, it would remove the softened soil and consistently leave a trench on the landward side of the wall, often exposing the underlying piling. A similar event would occur if the piling were heightened with a concrete wall, with the scour opening a channel along the wall on the landward side. This often exposed the underlying piling as shown in figures 4A and 4B.
This linear scour trench resulted in a higher cantilever length with less foundation embedment, making the system weaker. When a metal sheet-pile wall without a concrete overwall and embedded in disturbed saturated soil was exposed, water pressure would push against the weakened soil until the piling was bent over in a landward (protected side) direction, as shown in figure 5. Similar failure mechanisms are evident at several points along LA-23 (figs. 6A and 6B).
It is noteworthy that in most cases the piling wall remained connected even when significantly displaced, compromising its functionality. Being more brittle, however, a concrete overwall would separate at the joints, which in some instances led to a complete collapse, as shown in figure  7 . With this background, it is interesting to examine some 
The Industrial Canal
Two significant failures occurred along the eastern floodprotection system of the Industrial Canal in New Orleans. At the larger breach (~900 ft wide (274 m wide)) on the south side just north of Louisiana Highway 39 (Claiborne Avenue), the piling was carried an extended distance into the breach (more than 150 ft (46 m)). The flood-protection system consisted of a small (~5 ft high (1.5 m high)) earthen base levee with a partitioned structure called an I-wall on top. The term "I-wall" is used when the structural portion of the wall above the ground is a single vertical panel (I-shaped as opposed to L-shaped) supported on steel sheet piling. More specifically at this location, the I-wall consisted of steel sheet piles embedded 15 ft (4.6 m) in the ground and a concrete panel which extends about 8.5 ft (2.6 m) above the ground. The concrete wall all along the segment was crushed, which is likely the result of a barge impact during the flood (figs. 8-10). The actual timeline and sequence of events or cause of the failure is not known. This barge was carried into the residential area from a significant distance, and the houses that lie behind the barge were protected from the flood waters and experienced less damage. It is clear that the levee failure was worsened by the impact of the barge, which likely caused a substantial portion of the wall to collapse and the piling wall (still largely intact) to be carried a significant distance into the breach. 
The 17th Street and London Avenue Canals
In contrast to the previously described failures that initiated with overtopping of the floodwalls, the 17th Street Canal and London Avenue Outfall Canal breaches did not follow this failure mode. The location of the 17th Street Canal breach was just south of the Robert E. Lee Boulevard on its west bank. The breach of the 17th Street Canal levee was not the result of overtopping, as the water was approximately 3 ft (0.9 m) below the top of the wall, as indicated by water marks and other gages in the area (Seed and others, 2005) . The levee failed because of water pressure causing it to slide approximately 50 ft (15 m) atop weak foundation materials that consisted of organic-rich marsh and swamp deposits. Trees, fences, and other features on or near the levee moved horizontally but experienced very little rotation, except at the very toe of the slide. The foundation soils consist of very soft, organic clay and peat and decomposing wood as can be seen in the dark soils shown in figure 11B. These extremely weak soil conditions are the most likely causes for the failure at this location, resulting in a major breach about 450 ft (137 m) wide, which caused flooding in the Lakeview residential area ( fig. 12) .
Two major breaches occurred along the London Avenue Outfall Canal, one north on its west bank and the other on Maribeau Avenue on its east bank. The subsurface soils at these two breaches tend to be more sandy than do those along the 17th Street Canal. They consist of a relatively thick deposit of sands, overlain by a thinner layer of marsh and peat deposits that vary in thickness. The failure mechanisms at these sites are less well understood but may result from a combination of underseepage and the length of sheet-pile embedment (Seed and others, 2005) . It was surprising that the levee continued to leak in the middle of October 2005 after the levees were temporarily repaired, since the piling remained intact in other places. One hypothesis based on exposed locations at the base of the concrete I-wall is that the piling may not have been continuous or was too short.
Conclusion
The flood-protection system of the Mississippi River Delta consisted of a combination of earthen levees, sheet-pile walls, and concrete overwalls. Performance of the system during and after Katrina and its ability to hold back the resultant flood waters was mixed, and numerous failures of the system made this one of the most devastating disasters in U.S. history.
The most prevalent failure mechanism was the overtopping of walls, with scour at the base of the protected side and subsequent overturning of the system. In other locations where the soil conditions were uniquely soft or permeable, the designed protective system was not able to resist the lateral pressure of flood waters before failure. A A
